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Topical ADA Archive

Regarded as/Record of

• Andrews v. State of Ohio, (CA 6), 6 AD Cases 322, 1/13/1997
  
  Summary: State troopers who exceeded weight limit under state's Highway Patrol Fitness Program and failed to meet its fitness criteria have not alleged that state perceived them to be impaired under ADA or Rehabilitation Act of 1973, since they do not allege that their weights or cardiovascular fitness is beyond normal range or that they suffer from physiological disorder, and their allegations establish only that they have certain physical characteristics--either being marginally above weight limit or marginally below fitness standard--that state has deemed inconsistent with job requirements of certain law enforcement positions.
  
  
• Bute v. Schuller International, (DC NGa), 7 AD Cases 1607, 2/27/1998
  
  Summary: Fact that employer regarded plaintiff as unable to perform duties of machine attendant because his back injury precluded him from lifting heavy objects does not compel conclusion that it regarded him as disabled, where its placement of limitations on his employment was based on lifting restrictions imposed on him by three different physicians.
  
  
• Cody v. Cigna Healthcare, (CA 8), 7 AD Cases 1716, 3/16/1998
  
  Summary: Employer's offer to give employee paid medical leave and its requirement that she see psychologist before returning to work do not show that it regarded her as disabled. Employer's request for an evaluation is not the equivalent to treating the employee as though she were substantially impaired. Requesting a mental evaluation is not inappropriate if it is not obvious that employee suffers from disability; employers need to be able to use reasonable means to ascertain the cause of employee's troubling behavior without exposing themselves to ADA claims.
  
  
• Columbus Civil Service Commission v. McGlone, (Ohio SupCt), 8 AD Cases 737, 8/12/1998
  (Link is to a Microsoft Word document)
  
  Summary: Firefighter recruit who was rejected due to his nearsightedness was not perceived as "handicapped'' under Ohio law. Inability to perform a single job because of the employee's medical condition does not transform the condition into a handicap, and for recruit to prevail on perception theory city would have had to consider his nearsightedness as foreclosing him from a class of jobs.
  
  
• Colwell v. Suffolk County Police, (CA 2), 8 AD Cases 1232,10/15/1998
  
  Summary: Former county police officer who was hospitalized for 30 days following cerebral hemorrhage did not establish record of impairment, despite his reliance on open-ended light duty assignment--which he concedes is not evidence of continuing disability--to prolong indefinitely disabling experience of single episode of hospitalization. Employer that accedes to minor and potentially debatable accommodations does not thereby stipulate to employee's record of chronic and endless disability. Otherwise, costless accommodations to physical complaints would entail large future costs, would discourage employment of persons with minor limitations, and would promote litigation without assisting persons entitled to protection of ADA.
  
  
• Francis v. City of Meriden, (CA 2), 7 AD Cases 955, 11/17/1997
  
  Summary: Individual cannot state valid "regarded as'' claim simply by alleging that employer believes that some physical condition, such as height, weight, or hair color, renders him disabled.
  
  
• Gutridge v. Clure, (CA 8), 8 AD Cases 705, 8/26/1998
  
  Summary: Former employee's five separate surgeries, wraps, splints, medication, work restrictions, and inability to do manual tasks do not create record of impairment under ADA, where he has not shown that one or more of his major life activities were substantially limited. Simply being hospitalized does not establish record of impairment within meaning of ADA.
  
  
• Maloney v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., (Ohio CtApp), 7 AD Cases 1603, 2/14/1996
  
  Summary: Hospital's refusal to allow licensed practical nurse with back injury to return until she could work without restrictions does not establish that it regarded her as having impairment that substantially limited major life activity. At most, hospital regarded her as having minor injury that temporarily interfered with her ability to perform all functions of job, including lifting and turning patients.
  
  
• McCollough v. Atlanta Beverage Co., (DC NGa 1996), 7 AD Cases 1845, 2/27/1996
  
  Summary: Employer did not regard former route assistant with bad back as disabled when it terminated him as a result of his representations of his inability to continue doing work that was primary duty of his position. Employer's recognition of his limitations was not erroneous perception but instead was recognition of fact called to its attention by his own physician.
  
  
• Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., (Sup.Ct.) (97-1992), (BNA cite not yet available), 6/22/1999
  
  Employee is not "regarded as" disabled because of his high blood pressure. A person is "regarded as" disabled within the ADA's meaning if, among other things, a covered entity mistakenly believes that the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Here, employer does not regard employee as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, but, rather, regards him as unqualified to work as a UPS mechanic because he is unable to obtain DOT health certification. When referring to the major life activity of working, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines "substantially limits" as "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 CFR §1630(j)(3)(i). Thus, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job. Assuming without deciding that the EEOC regulations are valid, the Court concluded that the evidence that the employee is regarded as unable to meet the DOT regulations is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs utilizing his skills. At most, the employee has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a commercial motor vehicle-a specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce. He has put forward no evidence that he is regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job that does not call for driving a commercial motor vehicle and thus does not require DOT certification. Indeed, it is undisputed that he is generally employable as a mechanic, and there was uncontroverted evidence that he could perform a number of mechanic jobs.
  
  
• Olson v. Dubuque Community School Dist., (CA 8) 7 AD Cases 1598, 3/2/1998
  
  Summary: Criticism in performance evaluation of elementary school guidance counselor's work during her first year of employment does not furnish evidence that it regarded her as disabled. Evaluation simply identifies ways in which supervisors believed that her work was deficient.
  
  
• Polesnak v. R.H. Management Systems, (DC WPa), 6 AD Cases 417, 1/3/1997
  
  Summary: Restaurant violated ADA when it discharged manager who weighed 375 pounds at time of discharge, where he has shown that it perceived him as having a disability, that he was otherwise qualified to perform essential functions of job, and that he suffered discrimination because of disability.
  
  
• Richards v. City of Topeka, (CA 10), 9 AD Cases 333, 3/24/1999
  
  Summary: City did not regard pregnant firefighter as disabled when it reassigned her to light duty and did not allow her to return to full duty during her pregnancy, despite contention that reassignment showed that city regarded her pregnancy as impairment. Firefighter concedes that pregnancy was not a substantially limiting impairment.
  
  
• Riemer v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., (CA 7), 8 AD Cases 440, 6/29/1998
  
  Summary: Employee presented sufficient evidence at trial to support jury's determination that state department of transportation perceived his asthma as substantially limiting his ability to breathe. Department did not dispute that it reassigned him to a less favorable field job after its physician found that his job in the fabrication shop was exacerbating his condition and recommended that he be reassigned or that he consider new line of work altogether. Supervisor testified that he believed people with asthma experience difficulty breathing and that fabrication shop fumes aggravate this difficulty.
  
  
• Roberts v. Unidynamics Corp., (CA 8), 7 AD Cases 1867, 10/6/1997
  
  Summary: Discharged employee has not shown that rumors that he had Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) reached decisionmakers who terminated him. Employee admitted at trial that no comments to that effect were made by or to employer's officials, and statement by supervisor that he was a liability to the company and should find new job does not necessarily show link to HIV or AIDS, particularly as supervisor knew that his real ailment was Graves' disease.
  
  
• Skorup v. Modern Door Corporation, (CA 7) 8 AD Cases 808, 8/26/1998
  
  Summary: ADA claimant cannot establish that employer regarded her as disabled merely by showing that it was aware of her impairment; instead, she must show that it knew of impairment and believed that she was substantially limited because of it.
  
  
• Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., (DC Utah), 7 AD Cases 1883, 3/31/1998
  
  Summary: Former flight nurse who was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis resigned from her position when her employer, a hospital, failed to return her to that job. Even though the employee was able to obtain a job as a flight nurse for another employee, the hospital had not regarded her as disabled, but regarded her as very capable of performing any nursing job other than flight nurse and gave her opportunity to perform numerous other nursing jobs. The fact that its standards may differ from those of other employer does not support claim of discrimination.
  
  
• Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., (Sup.Ct.) (97-1943), (BNA cite not yet available), 6/22/1999
  
  Summary: Petitioners failed to allege properly that they are "regarded as," having an impairment that "substantially limits" a major life activity. Generally, these claims arise when an employer mistakenly believes that an individual has a substantially limiting impairment. To support their claims, petitioners allege that respondent has an impermissible vision requirement that is based on myth and stereotype and that respondent mistakenly believes that, due to their poor vision, petitioners are unable to work as "global airline pilots" and are thus substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Creating physical criteria for a job, without more, does not violate the ADA. The ADA allows employers to prefer some physical attributes over others, so long as those attributes do not rise to the level of substantially limiting impairments. An employer is free to decide that physical characteristics or medical conditions that are not impairments are preferable to others, just as it is free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for a job. An employer's physical criteria are permissible so long as they do not cause the employer to make an employment decision based on an impairment, real or imagined, that it regards as substantially limiting a major life activity. Petitioners have not alleged, and cannot demonstrate, that respondent's vision requirement reflects a belief that their vision substantially limits them.
  
  
• Vardiman v. Ford Motor Co., (DC EMo), 7 AD Cases 1068, 11/13/1997
  
  Summary: Employee assistance program (EAP) representative is not an "agent'' of the employer, and the representative's knowledge of the employee's alcoholism is thus not imputable to the employer, since an EAP representative cannot be the employer's "agent'' within meaning of ADA. EAP representative has no power to affect employment decisions and, in fact, is obligated to shield decisionmakers from the employee's personal or substance abuse problems. The representative committed no act even remotely cognizable under the ADA, and there is no evidence that she breached her duty of confidentiality.